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Water diplomacy and shared
resources along the United
States-Mexico border
Maria Elena Giner and Gabriel E. Eckstein

The United States and Mexico are geographic neighbors with high
economic asymmetry, but with intense shared history and deep social,
cultural, economic, and security ties. Among these shared interests
are 23 rivers and numerous aquifers along the 3,000 km border.1 Of
these, two are the primary focus of the two governments, the Colorado
and Rio Grande rivers. These scarce resources in the region, which
ranges from semiarid in the west to arid in the center and humid in
the east, require cooperation to manage and have been responsible for
shaping much of the 170+ year relationship.
In 2015, over 15.3 million people resided along the United StatesMexico border in ten states, which include 24 counties in the United
States and 35 municipalities in Mexico.2 Ninety percent of the residents
on the border live in 15 sister cities linked through trade, employment,
culture, and education, among others (see Figure 3.1).3 Movement of
goods and people across the border is part of everyday life in this region. For example, in 2016, over 180 million persons crossed into the
United States from Mexico through the 55 ports of entry in personal
vehicles or as pedestrians for purposes of tourism, shopping, or day
trips.4 Also, the highest concentration of US manufacturing associated
with foreign direct investment exists along the United States-Mexico
border and is one of the most important sources of employment for
this region.5 The population in the border region has grown at a faster
pace than that of the general population in both the United States and
Mexico.6 The accelerated growth along the border has aggravated the
need for water and other basic infrastructure in a region where budgets allocated for such amenities are below required levels. As a result,
human health and the environment in this region have been negatively
impacted on both sides.
Common water supplies, including the border’s two major rivers, the Colorado and Rio Grande (see Figure 3.2), and numerous

Figure 3.1 United States-Mexico border region.
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Figure 3.2 Colorado River and Rio Grande basins.

transboundary aquifers, have been negatively impacted by drought,
overdraft, and pollution that have increased salinity levels and degraded water quality. About 97 percent of the basin of the Colorado
River lies within the United States. Originating in the state of Colorado, the river’s basin traverses Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and California before reaching Mexico.7 Approximately 40 million residents rely
on Colorado and its tributaries for municipal use, of which 2 million
are in Mexico.8 The Rio Grande River also originates in the state of
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Colorado and crosses New Mexico before forming the international
boundary between Texas and Mexico. It is the fifth longest river in the
United States and supplies water to more than six million residents in
both countries.9 Since 1848, as populations and economic growth in
the border region have continuously expanded, these two rivers have
been the focus of cooperation between the United States and Mexico.
Today, the primary institutions involved in cooperation over water
resources along the border include the International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC) and the North American Development
Bank (NADB).10 Scholarly literature consistently associates these two
organizations with transboundary water issues and concurs on five
basic premises: (1) much work has been accomplished along the border
to address disputes and the discharge of wastewater into shared water
bodies; (2) the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) injected much-needed attention on the need to address transboundary
water pollution through wastewater infrastructure, as well as funding
for such projects from the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and Mexico’s National Water Commission (Conagua);
(3) the IBWC and NADB are unique institutions with fairly robust
systems for funding infrastructure and water governance respectively;
(4) in the last 75 years, nearly every dispute related to transboundary water was resolved through cooperation;11 and (5) more work on
transboundary water issues is needed related to supply, pollution, and
usage, especially as it pertains to drought and climate change.12
Each organization has contributed to different elements of cooperation over shared water resources and pollution prevention in the
border region. The IBWC has managed water allocation and water
pollution, and the NADB has developed and financed infrastructure
projects for local communities to address water pollution. Collectively,
these activities have contributed to the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of water conflicts throughout the United States-Mexico border
through cooperation13 and supported dispute prevention ahead of the
need for resolution.

Primary Mexico-United States treaties for
transboundary waters
A series of treaties between the United States and Mexico serve as the
basis for cooperation over shared water resources in the border region.
See Figure 3.3 for a timeline of these agreements.
The earliest treaty was signed shortly after the Mexican-American
War: the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlements
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Figure 3.3 Timeline of relevant treaties identified by the authors.

between the US and Mexico.14 This agreement established the physical
boundaries between the two countries and designates the Colorado
and Rio Grande rivers to become international basins. The agreement
was followed by five lesser, but still significant conventions, through
which the two countries cooperated on a range of issues: placement of
boundary monuments; boundary disputes related to meandering rivers; establishment of the International Boundary Commission (IBC);
allocation of water in a segment of the Rio Grande; and construction
of the commission’s first joint infrastructure project, the Rio Grande
Rectification Project.
In 1944, the two countries entered a new treaty that continues to
guide and influence water management and allocation decisions in the
border region today. The Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 Water Treaty)
authorized the joint construction and operation of two dams along the
lower basin of the Rio Grande, expansion of the IBC’s jurisdiction to
include water and, thereby, creation of the IBWC, and distribution of
the waters of the major cross border watersheds: the Colorado River,
Tijuana River, and Rio Grande.15 It also tasked the IBWC by addressing border sanitation issues with a transboundary impact.
In the Colorado River, under Article 10 of the 1944 Water Treaty,
the United States is required to ensure Mexico receives 1,850,234,000
cubic meters of water annually. In the Rio Grande, the treaty recognizes the bifurcation of the river as two separate basins and allocates
only the waters of the lower basin amongst the two countries in specific
terms. Under Article 1 of the 1906 Convention between the United
States and Mexico “Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio
Grande,” the United States is required to deliver 74,008,800 cubic meters annually of water to Mexico from the upper basin. Article 4 of the
1944 Water Treaty allocates to Mexico two-thirds and to the United
States one-third of the waters of six Mexican tributaries (Conchos,
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San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado rivers, and the Las
Vacas Arroyo), which collectively must amount to at least 431,721,000
cubic meters per year averaged over a five-year cycle.16 The 1944 Water Treaty also apportions to Mexico the entire flow of two Mexican
tributaries, the San Juan and Alamo rivers, while the United States
is allotted the entire flow of seven US tributaries: the Pecos and Devil’s rivers, the Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe, and Pinto creeks, and
Goodenough Spring. The remaining waters in the lower Rio Grande
basin are shared equally under the treaty.17
A distinctive element of the 1944 Water Treaty is the linkage embedded into the agreement that includes the distribution of waters
from two rivers in two geographically different regions along the border serving different basins. Itay Fischhendler et.al. argue that this
arrangement has constrained the ability of the two nations to adapt
management regimes in response to the unique environmental stresses
of each river.18 Yet, Minutes 318, 319, and 323—which responded to
reduced flows in the Colorado and environmental degradation in the
Colorado delta, and created a mechanism for Mexico to store its water
allocations within the US—suggest such concerns can be addressed
through the IBWC’s unique minute system for interpreting and implementing the 1944 Water Treaty. Fischhendler et.al. also highlight that
while Mexico receives water from, but does not contribute to, the Colorado River’s volume, the United States receives more water from the
entire Rio Grande than it contributes to that river.19 To some extent,
it appears that in developing the 1944 Water Treaty, the parties traded
water from one watershed in exchange for water from another, an option that would not have been readily available had they negotiated
separate agreements for each river.
While, on balance, this arrangement may appear fair to some and
unfair to others, it was the product of more than 20 years of negotiations involving issues beyond the mere allocation of water, including
population pressures, sanitation, droughts and floods, economic development, and border security.20 Such pressures may have contributed to the two nations expanding the scope of the treaty to the three
rivers in order to have more options for negotiating their respective
priorities. Moreover, there may be an advantage to having only one
institution with responsibility for all three rivers as the delivery and
use of water across borders often involves multiple diverse stakeholders with broadly different interests. If ever the treaty was opened for
renegotiations, the consolidated approach could allow the two nations
to fully consider all the diverse interests and priorities, as well as the
implications for all of the encompassed river basins.21
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More recently, the United States and Mexico entered into two additional agreements that expanded their transboundary interests
beyond water, but have proven to be critically important for water
management because of the actors brought into the conversation. On
14 August 1983, the United States and Mexico signed the Agreement
on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement), which serves as the basis
for bilateral cooperation on environmental protection in the border
zone, defined as 100 km north and south of the international line.22
The agreement stipulates obligations related to consultation, information sharing, review of environmental concerns, annual meetings,
and formal reporting.23 It also designates the respective federal environmental agencies as the coordinators, thereby tasking the EPA
and Mexico’s Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) with protecting human health and the environment and
obligating them to monitor and measure pollution levels related to
water and air. Moreover, it obligates them to consult with state and
municipal governments, nongovernmental organizations, and others
on cooperative measures.24
Initially, the La Paz Agreement was used as a diplomatic instrument
between the two governments through its respective environmental
agencies to establish goals and objectives primarily related to water,
air, and land issues. More recently, it has become a mechanism to provide joint funding. Binational initiatives include the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (1992–1994), Border XXI (1995–2000), Border
2012 (2001–2012), and Border 2020 (2013–2020).25 The latter’s goal of
access to clean and safe water includes objectives on increasing household water and sewer connections for the communities along the border, assisting utilities to build capacity, watershed protection through
reduction of surface water contaminants, and sharing of water quality
data for transboundary watersheds by both federal governments.26 It
also calls for additional investment in water resource management.
Under the auspices of the La Paz Agreement, these programs serve
as an institutional framework for cooperation between the two governments, raise awareness of environmental issues along the border,
and provide a certain level of legitimacy that further strengthens engagement among the various government agencies, most notably the
IBWC, which has authority over transboundary water issues.27
Development of the goals and objectives of the La Paz Agreement
is based on stakeholder engagement and a system of five taskforces
geographically distributed along the border.28 Taskforce members include representatives from state and local governments, tribal groups,
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academia, and nongovernmental organizations. This grassroots approach, managed binationally by EPA and SEMARNAT, follows a
process of engagement through conferences with experts on water, air,
and land issues, a yearly national conference, and various public comment opportunities. To some extent, this participatory approach has
provided legitimacy to the goals and objectives set under the framework of the La Paz Agreement with each successive program building
on the previous one.
During the early 1990s when NAFTA was being negotiated, environmentalists expressed their growing dissatisfaction with the results
of the La Paz Agreement.29 They had expected more attention and
resources from the two federal governments and highlighted worsening environmental conditions in the border region where some of the
poorest communities were located. During this time, many communities along the border did not have wastewater treatment, and pollution
of transboundary rivers was an issue. Broadening support for NAFTA
presented an opportunity to raise awareness of these conditions on
the coattails of that agreement’s authorization process, and to link the
border’s environmental health to trade.
As a result, the two countries were pressed by environmental stakeholder groups to sign an agreement within the framework of the negotiations of NAFTA, known formally as the Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank (NADB Agreement).30 It created the NADB, which
diverged in structure and process from the IBWC and included water
pollution, wastewater treatment, and other priorities within its mandate. Moreover, the NADB is truly a binational institution equally
funded by both governments. Over the past 170 years, the implementation and evolution of these agreements along the United States-Mexico
border have created a unique governance structure for cooperation.

The organizations
The IBWC, initially called the International Boundary Commission
when it was created in 1889, changed to the current name under the
1944 Water Treaty in recognition of its expanded jurisdiction, which
now included the waters traversing the border. This broader authority
authorized the IBWC to engage in binational solutions for issues that
arose during the application of United States-Mexico treaties regarding water-related boundary demarcation and rights to transboundary
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waters, as well as issues related to sanitation, water quality, and flood
control in the frontier. The US Section has its principal offices in El
Paso, Texas, while the Mexican Section operates across the border in
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. Both sections also have seven field offices
spread out along the border. Each section receives funding and policy
guidance from its respective diplomacy agency, the US Department of
State and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry.
All staff of the IBWC are federal employees of their respective country. The leadership team in each country includes a commissioner,
who must be an engineer and is appointed directly by the president of
the respective country, two principal engineers, a legal advisor, and a
foreign affairs secretary.31 The management staff is composed primarily of technically oriented professionals and is proud of its reputation
as an engineering agency that gives policy guidance based on science.
This unique element of management is the basis of the IBWC’s legitimacy, which has been called engineering diplomacy.32 While its original priority focused on maintaining the international boundary, its
authority has now grown to include water quantity and quality management, border sanitation, and emergency water supplies. Stephen
Mumme suggests that
most important, the Commission has evolved as both a diplomatic
and technical agency, with primary responsibilities for enforcing
and interpreting the provisions of the international treaties with
which it is entrusted, and anticipating and designing solutions to
new problems within its jurisdiction.33
The IBWC collectively owns and operates major infrastructure including flood control levees and five diversion dams, as well as two major reservoirs with power plant facilities located on the Rio Grande:
Amistad and Falcon dams.34 This infrastructure is used to manage
water delivery for both countries from the Rio Grande and Colorado
River and is needed to address portions of the mandate associated
with water quality monitoring, transboundary water deliveries, and
flood control. As part of its sanitation mandate, the IBWC also owns
and operates three international wastewater treatment plants. These
facilities were built to address untreated wastewater flows primarily
originating from Mexico and flowing into the United States. However,
the Nogales facility also treats wastewater from both Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora. Funding for the construction, operation,
and maintenance of these facilities is provided by both countries. Over
the last 30 years, no significant infrastructure facilities have been built
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in the border region, although the IBWC has rehabilitated a number
of existing facilities.
The 1944 Water Treaty also allows the IBWC to document decisions
involving the application of its mandate through minutes, binding
instruments between the two governments.35 These are agreements
covering a range of cross-border issues that mostly address demarcation, operation, and maintenance of its infrastructure, water delivery
related to drought and eco-systems, construction or rehabilitation of
dams and other facilities, water quality issues such as salinity in water
delivery, and water pollution and sanitation issues that cross the international boundary, such as stormwater and untreated wastewater.
Minutes are developed between the two IBWC sections and validated
by the respective foreign affairs units.36 Once a minute is approved
by both countries through the IBWC and confirmed by the two governments within a 30-day review period, minutes are considered part
of the treaty. As of July 2019, 324 minutes have been issued by the
IBWC.37
The IBWC focuses its efforts on engineering activities and solutions
that may be proactive or reactive. Its actions are mostly technical, with
limited stakeholder involvement and within the limits of its authority
under the 1944 Water Treaty. Despite its long-standing operations, its
location on the border and away from the capitals of the respective
countries, some scholars have suggested that the IBWC is outmoded
and needs to innovate, be less insular, and expand its public engagement efforts.38 One has called the IBWC “a social artifact, imperfect at
best, and captive to the vicissitudes of time.”39 Stakeholders have also
expressed disappointment with the progress made on environmental
issues. Some have claimed that the IBWC’s narrow focus on water resources in the border region has led to the neglect of other critical concerns, including air quality and land conservation. While it may have
been logical to expand its mandate, they believe that the IBWC’s lack
of agility to respond to emerging issues, its heavy focus on engineered
solutions, and poor stakeholder engagement have not favored this
path. As a result, some have argued that the La Paz Agreement, which
created the NADB, was adopted because of the IBWC’s deficiencies.40
The NADB itself was created in 1993 with a strict mandate related to
the development and implementation of environmental infrastructure.
It works in coordination with state and federal agencies by assisting
local communities to improve environmental conditions and advance
the well-being of residents in both nations. Although the organization
does not own any infrastructure, its programs provide technical assistance, grants, loans, and capacity building to utilities, municipalities,
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academia, and the private sector for infrastructure development and
implementation. The NADB’s leadership team consists of a chief executive officer and chief operating officer of opposite nationalities, appointed by each government and confirmed by its Board of Directors
(BOD). Unlike the IBWC, the NADB is an international organization
with two contributing countries—the United States and Mexico. Its
BOD consists of ten members, five from each country. Four are members of the public at large and six come from federal agencies. Its employees are of both Mexican and US nationalities, co-located at its
offices in San Antonio and Ciudad Juarez, and benefit from certain
diplomatic immunities.
The NADB is capitalized in equal parts by the US Treasury and
Mexico’s Ministry of Finance. Its operations and programs are funded
by the interest earned on its capital and funds from the US State Department and SEMARNAT. It also receives program funds from the
EPA, to disburse as grants to local communities along the border, under the auspices of the Border 2012 and Border 2020 programs and the
Border Infrastructure Fund (BIF). This has considerably improved
water quality by eliminating the discharge of untreated sewage.
The NADB has been called the most consequential of the NAFTAgenerated institutions because of its significant impact on the border environment since its creation, especially as its actions relate to
transboundary water pollution.41 This was possible precisely because
the NADB was provided with important government backing from
multiple federal agencies. Since 1993, funding provided to the NADB
from the EPA, the US Treasury, Us State Department, and Mexico’s
Finance and Environment ministries has exceeded $1 billion.42 The
NADB has earned significant legitimacy with stakeholders in border
states and cities, as well as within academia. It also has implemented
successful projects in just about every major community along the
border. As of August 2017, its accomplishments included the funding
of 147 water and wastewater projects for various utilities, benefitting
almost 13 million residents. The improvements in wastewater alone
have a capacity to eliminate 462 million gallons per day of untreated
or inadequately treated sewage.43
Prior to the NADB’s efforts, only 21 percent of Mexican residents
along the border with the United States were connected to wastewater treatment facilities and typically discharged untreated sewage
into shared waterbodies on the frontier. Today, nearly 90 percent of
that population is connected to wastewater management facilities,
significantly reducing an important source of pollution.44 Similarly,
on the US side, prior to 1993, there were over 400,000 residents in
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unincorporated communities known as colonias in Texas and New
Mexico that did not have wastewater treatment services and that discharged their sewage into shared surface or groundwater bodies.45
Yet despite its successes in implementing infrastructure projects, the
NADB also has its challenges. It implements individual projects in response to requests submitted by municipalities.46 As a result, broader
watershed issues are not addressed comprehensively and are simply
cobbled together through individual local efforts. Currently, there is
no strategy in place at the NADB to address water management holistically, include groundwater, or consider issues related to drought or
climate change.

Future challenges along the border
As is typical of most watersheds, especially those in arid climates,
water is not always accessible in the quantity, quality, or location
where it is needed. Over-allocation of available water resources, prolonged droughts, and pollution are common challenges. In the United
States-Mexico border region, such challenges have sparked various
disputes, most notably pertaining to three primary issues: delivery of
water at specified times and volumes, water quality deficiencies mostly
related to salinity and pollution, and conservation for the protection of
the environment. To date, many of these disputes have been managed
under the 1944 Water Treaty by the IBWC through the minute process,
and for water pollution through the NADB funding programs. Two
important conflicts have been resolved through IBWC cooperation:
Mexico’s water debt to the United States in the Rio Grande for the
accounting cycle of 1997–2002; and pulse flow water deliveries in the
lower portion of the Colorado River to begin restoration of the river’s
delta ecosystem in Mexico, which has been designated as a United
Nations Biosphere Reserve.47 Other more recent conflicts that have
not been fully resolved include the lining of the All-American Canal in
Arizona, which lowered groundwater levels across the border in Mexicali, and stormwater pollution flows from Tijuana, Baja California
into San Diego, California during precipitation events.
However, as droughts and climate change continue to impact the
availability of water resources, and growing communities continue
to affect water quality, the challenges facing the border region will
need ongoing attention. In addition, the region faces new concerns
related to untreated wastewater from collapsing sewer lines in cities
adjacent to the international boundary, inadequately operated wastewater treatment plants, and contaminated stormwater from growing
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cities that primarily flow from Mexico into the United States. Unfortunately, neither country has given sufficient attention to the environmental impacts that these pollution concerns have had on estuaries,
fisheries, and recreational areas.
The La Paz Agreement and NAFTA through the NADB Agreement
have brought much attention to water issues along the border at the
highest levels of government. Key agencies such as the EPA and SEMARNAT have also entered the water diplomacy arena previously
dominated by the IBWC. This has introduced a different approach
to decision-making and water-related project development given the
EPA’s public transparency and regular engagement process, which is
in sharp contrast to the IBWC’s insular history reinforced by the 1944
Water Treaty’s omission of any required procedures for public participation or review of operations.48 In addition, the public process
associated with the La Paz Agreement and NADB Agreement has empowered local communities, states, nongovernmental organizations,
and academia to demand more from the IBWC. This unwanted attention from the public has further strengthened the negative perception of an IBWC that is slow to respond to challenges and criticism,
interprets its scope very narrowly, and heavily focuses its efforts on
engineered solutions.49
Although the NADB has also received the same pressures related
to public engagement, unlike the IBWC it has specific requirements
for engaging the public. These requirements were likely implemented
because the organization was conceived as part of an environmental
agenda and the EPA was directly involved in their creation. Furthermore, the EPA has provided the NADB with supplemental funds in
the form of grants to address water and sanitation issues, which furthered the latter’s achievements. Those funds were managed by the
NADB and were used to leverage matching funds from Conagua and
other state programs. These relationships and programs developed
a diverse skill set within the NADB related to projects that include
engineering, finance, and environmental awareness, as well as public
engagement.
The IBWC and NADB have two areas in which their activities
overlap. The first relates to water pollution where both organizations
worked on the issues. However, while the IBWC has not constructed
any major infrastructure in at least 30 years, the NADB regularly
continues to conduct ribbon-cutting ceremonies for newly funded
infrastructure. Not surprisingly, these efforts have given the NADB
a role in water diplomacy as well. The second area of overlap is the
limited geographical region in which both organizations work, which
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has facilitated a more localized approach. As compared to other federal or development agencies, whose locations are in Washington,
DC and Mexico City, the IBWC and NADB’s leadership and staff
live in or near border communities and are exposed to the region’s
daily challenges. This provides local communities with quick, direct,
and low-cost access to the institutions, and sensitizes staff to local
needs.
Nonetheless, the differences between the IBWC and NADB are important. The IBWC functions as two separate but integrated federal
agencies with independent sections representing their respective governments. As an institution, the IBWC has had a long history of activity, an established process of operations, a heavy engineering focus,
no funding for community infrastructure, and a reputation for being
isolated and limited in the interpretation of its own authority. The
established purpose, process, and rules that created the agency have
remained relatively consistent over its 130 years, and its mandate has
been interpreted rather narrowly. As a result, the IBWC could find it
difficult to adjust its operations in response to new challenges. Nevertheless, the organization has a strong and stable foundation grounded
in long-standing treaties, full federal backing, and assets that it owns
and operates.
In contrast, the NADB is an international organization with much
less federal oversight, a shorter history, established public engagement
processes, multi-skilled binational staff, and available funding for infrastructure. However, its limited mandate and project-specific focus
constrains its ability to create policy level and holistic solutions related
to water supply and quality.
Despite the IBWC’s stability and NADB’s flexibility, neither provides an ideal model of operation. For example, it is unclear whether
either entity has the mandate to address the more than 30 aquifers
that traverse the border. With the exception of pumping restrictions
on the Yuma Aquifer under Minute 242, none of the aquifers have
any management, allocation, or conservation mechanisms. Ironically,
groundwater is a major regional concern because subsurface depletion can affect surface flows in adjacent rivers, pollution can negatively impact groundwater quality, and drought can affect both rivers
and groundwater. In a similar vein, neither the IBWC nor NADB have
the capacity to develop the scientific analyses needed to ascertain how
the border region will be affected by climate change. In general, cooperation remains unsystematic and ad hoc and lacks a broader vision
for the management of the shared water resources between the two
nations.50
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the existing river basin organization
(RBO) framework is insufficient to address challenges in the basins
and has overlaps and important gaps. Cooperation has been achieved
through the minute process of the IBWC but has been limited to the
narrow scope of the Colorado, Rio Grande, and Tijuana rivers. Other
mechanisms used to address border water issues include various
binational federal efforts, such as the La Paz Agreement and NADB
Agreement. Both instruments have been used to remedy the gaps unaddressed by the IBWC, most importantly providing a mechanism for
public engagement on water management issues at the state and local
levels. However, their success has been limited to the extent that they
have only created a patchwork of local project agreements rather than
a comprehensive mechanism.
To add to this patchwork, a binational groundwater assessment program was initiated as a basis for information exchange through the
US Geological Survey and Conagua.51 While coordinating with the
IBWC, it is not clear if any single institution will serve as an RBO.
The institutional requirements and legal regimes in each country are
quite distinct and would require multi-level and multi-jurisdiction
agreements to create such an RBO.
Natural resources are limited, and freshwater is diminishing in
availability and quality along the United States-Mexico border. The
vitality of communities along the border depends on these rivers and
groundwater resources. Although the two countries have experienced
challenges and disputes since their creation, over the past 170 years
a treaty-based institutional framework for surface water has provided the governance mechanisms needed to promote cooperation
over conflict.52 Both the NADB and IBWC have been successful in
applying their respective mandates because they were institutionally
located along the border, their leadership was required to be technocrats rather than bureaucrats or diplomats, and they were structured
to facilitate trust between the two countries. The IBWC has also been
successful because of its singular structure as a binational federal
agency with two sections, each responding to and advocating for its
respective country. Moreover, each section was given authority to enter into agreements through the very unique minute system by which
the agreements are crafted on the border and then sent to the respective capitals for approval/rejection. In addition, the structure of the
NADB as a single international organization with both Mexican and
American nationals co-located and governed by a binational board
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has engendered trust from states and local communities as a neutral
party. Combined with its history of achievement and management of
significant funds, the NADB has gained considerable recognition and
respect among the border states and local communities in a relatively
short time.
Yet, more needs to be done for both surface and subsurface water
resources, and the challenges that they face from drought and climate
change. In particular, the lack of meaningful cooperation over the region’s shared aquifers with a clear authority eventually could become
a source of dispute between the two countries. In addition, currently
there is no strategy in place to address water management holistically
or to consider issues related to drought or climate change.
At the moment, there seems to be little appetite to expand the
purview of the IBWC or NADB and put one of these in charge of a
strategy for comprehensive water management, much less with the
authority to manage all water resources on the border. While expanding the IBWC’s authority may seem like the most obvious solution,
the NADB’s efforts in recent years have diverted attention and considerable funding away from the IBWC. As a result, gaps in management and cooperation are likely to continue in the border region
and for its residents, especially as water becomes scarcer and demand
continues to grow.
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